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Abstract
This paper resolves several controversies in CEA. Generalizing [Garber, A.M., Phelps, C.E., 1997. Economic foundations of cost-
effectiveness analysis. Journal of Health Economics 16 (1), 1–31], the paper shows accounting for unrelated future costs distorts
decision making. After replicating [Meltzer, D., 1997. Accounting for future costs in medical cost-effectiveness analysis. Journal of
Health Economics 16 (1), 33–64] quite different conclusion that unrelated future costs should be included in CEA, the paper shows
that Meltzer’s findings result from modeling the budget constraint as an annuity, which is problematic. The paper also shows that
related costs should be included in CEA. This holds for a variety of models, including a health maximization model. CEA should
treat costs in the manner recommended by Garber and Phelps.
© 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
JEL classification: I18; D61
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1. Introduction
Economists have debated whether future medical costs should be incorporated in cost effectiveness analyzes for a
number of years. Indeed, the Panel on Cost-Effectiveness in Health and Medicine was unable to reach consensus on
this issue (Russell, 1986; Mushlin and Fintor, 1992; Weinstein et al., 1996). Meltzer (1997) has subsequently advanced
theoretical arguments that, in his view, showed that “cost-effectiveness analysis must include the total change in
future expenditures which results from a medical intervention, regardless of whether those expenditures are medical
or non-medical (Meltzer, 1997, p. 41).” Garber and Phelps (1997) demonstrate that less general models imply that
unrelated future costs should be excluded, but do not directly contest Meltzer’s conclusions. Indeed, Garber (2000), p.
203, subsequently conjectures that generalizing their model by allowing for “intertemporal reallocation of income and
consumption” might yield Meltzer’s results. This is not a point of emphasis, however, because they stress that, at the
margin, interventions should have the same cost per quality adjusted life year whether or not future costs are included.
From this they infer that “the inclusion of future costs is without consequence so long as the practice is consistent
(Garber and Phelps, 1997, p. 25).”
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There is general agreement that cost effectiveness analyzes should account for related costs. The controversy
is primarily about the treatment of unrelated future costs, but it is important to understand that both terms have
non-colloquial meanings in this context. In cost effectiveness analysis future costs are termed unrelated if they are
independent of current spending, apart from the effects of that spending on survival. Of course, if an intervention
has significant effects on survival, it can have a major impact on spending, but such spending would be considered
unrelated. For example, compared to bypass surgery, angioplasty appears to reduce mortality for high-risk patients
with cardiovascular disease (Stroupe et al., 2006). Patients who live longer obviously use more medical care, but these
costs would be considered unrelated to angioplasty. Costs of other cardiac care that do not appear to be affected by the
choice of angioplasty or bypass surgery (e.g., treatment of aneurisms) would also be considered unrelated. In contrast,
patients who choose angioplasty are more likely to require revascularization than patients who choose bypass surgery,
and these added revascularization costs are considered related to angioplasty. In practice, as Weinstein and Manning
(1997) note, teasing apart related and unrelated costs can be quite challenging. Nonetheless, the core issue for this
paper is whether changes in spending that are solely due to changes in survival – i.e., unrelated costs – should be
included in cost effectiveness analyzes.
Meltzer argues that cost effectiveness analyzes should incorporate related and unrelated future costs. He also argues
that these costs should be measured as the present value of the difference between labor earnings and total spending
weighted by the change in survival probabilities. And applied researchers appear to be taking note, as Meltzer’s
paper has been cited over 90 times. Although I have found no instances in which including unrelated future costs has
fundamentally changed an analyst’s assessment of an innovation, adhering to Meltzer’s protocol has changed a number
of cost effectiveness ratios. For example, in a study of adding a beta blocker to standard therapies for congestive heart
failure, Ekman et al. (2001) found that including future costs increased the cost per life year from $1717 per life year
to $22,137. Likewise, in an analysis of adding an angiotensin-converting enzyme inhibitor to the therapy of patients
at high risk of cardiovascular events, Bjorholt et al. (2002) found that accounting for unrelated future costs increased
the cost per life year gained from $2244 to $28,703. Meltzer et al. (2000) found that counting unrelated future costs
decreased the cost per quality adjusted life year of adding intensive therapy for patients with type 1 diabetes mellitus
from $22,576 to $9626. And Almbrand et al. (2000) found that recognizing unrelated future costs increased the cost
per quality adjusted life year of intense insulin treatment for diabetic patients who had experienced a heart attack from
$1772 to $28,467. Similarly, Johannesson et al. (1997) found that adding unrelated future costs in an assessment of
the treatment of hypertension increased the cost per quality adjusted life year by at least $26,000 for older patients.
All of these calculations, which are based on earnings, suggest that accounting for unrelated future costs is important.
Yet this paper argues that this is unlikely to be correct for two reasons. First, earnings-based estimates significantly
overstate unrelated future costs. Second, a compelling case for including unrelated future costs in cost effectiveness
analysis has yet to be made.
The remainder of paper rigorously examines the treatment of future costs in cost effectiveness analysis. Sec-
tion 2 analyzes Meltzer’s expected utility model using the Garber–Phelps budget constraint. This analysis finds, as
did Garber and Phelps, that optimality is inconsistent with inclusion of unrelated future costs. Section 3 extends
this by showing that consistency is not enough. Incorrectly calculating opportunity costs will distort decision mak-
ing except in special cases. Section 4 reassesses the Meltzer model. This analysis shows that the present value of
Meltzer’s measure of future costs is approximately zero. It also shows that his budget constraint is problematic. Sec-
tion 5 analyzes related costs, showing that their treatment should be quite different from unrelated costs. Section
6 shows that expected health maximization gives decision rules that parallel those of Garber and Phelps. Section 7
concludes.
2. A model with a Garber–Phelps budget constraint
This section analyzes a model that uses Meltzer’s objective function. It starts using a Garber–Phelps budget constraint
and replicates their result that an expected utility maximizer need not consider unrelated future costs. The section goes
on to show that this is also the case with a more general budget constraint that allows borrowing and lending.
Meltzer examines an expected utility framework for a representative consumer. Utility in each period depends on
consumption [ct] and health status [Ht]. Preferences satisfy the axioms of expected utility, so Ut(ct,H(Mt)) is strictly
increasing and concave. Health status depends on medical consumption to date, which is defined by the vector Mt = (m0,
m1, m2, . . ., mt). So, Ht = H(Mt). Utility is discounted by a time discount factor [βt] and a probability of survival that
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βtSt(Mt) Ut(ct, H(Mt)). (1)
In a model without capital markets the representative consumer cannot borrow or lend. In each period ct = yt − pmt.
This is precisely the model that Garber and Phelps analyze. Incorporating the budget constraint via substitution yields



























pβ0S0(M0) = 0. (3)
Eq. (4) simplifies and rearranges (3) to get the traditional link between expected utility maximization and cost utility
analysis. The simplifications are inessential. Eq. (4) gives full weight to the initial period, so β0 = S0(M0) = 1. Relaxing
these assumptions adds complexity, but no insight. The result that m0 should be chosen so that the cost per QALY
[p/*Δ0] is just equal to 1/(∂U0/∂c0), reproducing the finding of Garber and Phelps:











t(∂Ut/∂Ht)(∂Ht/∂m0) when the optimal values of ct and mt have been
chosen. Here *Δ0 is just the change in quality adjusted life years that the optimal m0 generates, an expression that will
appear unchanged several times.
Eq. (4) sharpens our inquiry. It implies that an expected utility maximizer who uses the Meltzer objective function
and the Garber–Phelps budget constraint need not consider unrelated future costs. The opportunity cost, p, does not
include any unrelated future costs. Meltzer’s different conclusion must be due to his different budget constraint or
hidden assumptions in his analysis.
In addition, repeating this analysis for different periods helps fine tune a question about unrelated future costs.
Consider optimal future medical consumption, *ms, for some unspecified future time period. The first-order conditions
for *ms are *γs = p/*Δs. The implication is that *ms will take full account of the opportunity costs of consuming it. The
reader can verify that all optimal values for all *cs will also fully account for opportunity costs. It is hard to understand,
therefore, why these costs need to be factored into other decisions as well.
Furthermore, one can add capital markets to the Garber–Phelps model without changing its implications (except that
doing so means that the marginal utility of income should be equalized over time). Let the consumer borrow (st > 0) or
lend (st < 0), so the budget constraint becomes ct = yt + (1 + r)at−1 + st − pmt. In this constraint r is the (assumed constant)
rate of return and at is assets, meaning that rat−1 might represent income or expense. The consumer’s assets are defined
by at = (1 + r)at−1 + st. Taken together, these imply a lifetime budget constraint of
∑
T(yt − ct − pmt) (1 + r)τ−t = 0,
assuming that the consumer has no starting assets and plans to have no ending assets. (Here τ denotes the final date in the
planning problem). To maximize
∑
Tβ
tSt(Mt)Ut(ct,H(Mt)) subject to the constraint that
∑
T(yt − ct − pmt)(1 + r)τ−t = 0,
the consumer should choose m0 so that *γ0 = p/*Δ0. Adding intertemporal reallocation of income and consumption
to the Garber–Phelps model does not change its implications.
3. Consistency
Garber and Phelps (1997) show that an expected utility maximizer ought to be consistent in applying cost utility
analysis. By consistent they mean that an individual should allocate resources so that the cost per QALY will be the
same for all possible interventions. I will replicate that result below. They go on to prove that including unrelated
future costs in an intervention’s opportunity cost should still lead an expected utility maximizer to equate the cost per
QALY across interventions. I will also replicate this result below. They then infer from these results that “the inclusion
of unrelated future costs is without consequence so long as the practice is consistent (p. 25).” I will show why that
conclusion is incorrect.
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To make these points I will examine an example in which the optimum entails positive levels of consumption of
two medical interventions, x0 and m0. As in the case that Garber and Phelps explore, the consumer must choose x0 and
m0 to maximize expected utility, which is given by
∑
Tβ
tSt(M,X)Ut(yt − pmt − qxt,H(Mt,Xt)). I will continue to follow














































qβ0S0 = 0. (7)
Again noting that β0 = S0 = 1, I find that optimality requires







t[St(M,X)(∂Ut/∂Ht)(∂Ht/∂x0) + Ut∂St/∂x0], the number of QALYs produced by *x0. Eq. (8) implies
that the cost per QALY should be the same for *m0 and *x0, so the consumer should display consistency in the sense
of Garber and Phelps.Now I will repeat the analysis, mistakenly including the present value of unrelated future costs
in the opportunity costs of m and x. Let μ represent a forecast of the present value of unrelated future costs for m0,
and let ξ represent a forecast of the present value of unrelated future costs for x0. As a result, I act as though m0 costs
(p + μ) per unit and x0 costs (q + ξ) per unit. At the resulting optimum the cost per QALY will again be equated:
(p + μ)
∗∗Δ0
= (q + ξ)∗∗Θ0 . (9)
So, my decision making will be consistent in the sense of Garber and Phelps, but will my choices of m0 and x0 remain
unchanged? To answer this question it is helpful to write *m0 and *x0 as the Marshallian demand functions m(p, q,
y) and x(p, q, y), and then examine under what circumstances (∂m/∂p)μ + (∂m/∂q)ξ = 0 = (∂x/∂q)ξ + (∂x/∂p)μ. This can
be rearranged to show that errors in forecasting future costs will not affect *m0 or *x0 in two cases. In one trivial case
*m0 and *x0 are zero with and without errors in estimating opportunity costs. In the other case all of the price and
cross-price elasticities of demand are zero. Nothing in the Garber–Phelps model (or in standard models of consumer
demand) rules out non-zero elasticities. Garber–Phelps consistency does not imply invariance of *m0 and *x0.
Erroneously treating the present value of future cost as a part of the opportunity cost of a product will not change the
form of the decision rules. But, except in special cases, doing so will alter the resulting choices. There are consequences
to incorrectly measuring opportunity costs.
An example in the spirit of Weinstein and Manning (1997) illustrates this. Suppose that two treatments are effective
for a condition. Analysts calculate that the cost per quality adjusted life year is $10,000 for treatment M and $15,000
for treatment X. However, inappropriately including the present value of unrelated future costs increases the cost per
quality adjusted life year to $22,000 for M. This mistake reverses the rankings of the treatments and reduces use of M.
Such a reversal could not occur for Garber and Phelps, as they focus on optima in which the representative consumer
adjusts consumption to equate the cost per quality adjusted life year. The consumer will do this (i.e., will be consistent)
whether he gets the opportunity costs right or wrong. If he mistakenly incorporates unrelated costs, he will consume
less M by limiting its use to situations in which its costs are lower or its benefits are greater. Furthermore, it will
be interventions with significant effects on survival (such as intensive treatment for diabetic patients or treatment of
hypertension) that will be most affected.
4. Reassessing the Meltzer model
Meltzer constrains expected lifetime spending to equal expected lifetime income, meaning that the consumer can
costlessly shift consumption between periods. No mechanism for doing this is spelled out, but the budget constraint
functions like a life annuity that uses the individual’s survival probabilities. This budget constraint is defined by Eq.
(10), which replicates Meltzer’s budget constraint except for two minor notation simplifications. Eq. (10) writes the
discounting function as δt rather than (1 + r)−t and deflates all expenditures by the price of the composite consumption





δtSt(Mt)(yt − ct − pmt). (10)
In the rest of this section I will demonstrate that this formulation of the budget constraint distinguishes Meltzer’s results
from those of Garber and Phelps.
Maximization of (1) subject to (10) yields the first-order conditions (11)–(13). We seek to evaluate current medical
spending, so now I will examine only the results for optimal c0 and m0. This allows me to simplify by taking advantage
of the fact the β0 = δ0 = S0(M0) = 1.
∂U0
∂c0


























(yt − ct − pmt) = 0. (12)
∑
T
δtSt(Mt)(yt − ct − pmt) = 0. (13)
As did Meltzer, I rearrange (11) and (12) to link optimal medical care consumption to cost utility analysis. Eq. (14)
implies that m0 should be chosen so that the adjusted cost per QALY is just equal to the inverse of the marginal utility
of consumption. The presence of the Meltzer effect, ϕ0, distinguishes this from the Garber–Phelps result of Section 2:







t(∂St/∂m0)(yt − ct − pmt).
What is 0? It is the present value of optimal savings multiplied by the change in survival probabilities. Below I
will point out a theoretical difficulty with this formulation, but an empirical question needs to be raised first.
The effect of ϕ0 could still be negligible if savings are small. Recognizing that it represents an imperfect guide to
the savings plans of consumers who are contemplating various medical interventions, Meltzer draws on the Consumer
Expenditure Survey to approximate yt − ct − pmt for the general population. In doing so, though, he makes an important
change from the model outlined above. Rather than looking at population values for income minus expenditure for
individuals in households with heads of different ages, he tabulates values for earnings minus expenditure. This is
the case even though Meltzer specifically notes that insurance (e.g., social security and life annuities) is a common
feature of retirement. Of course income from other assets (such as housing, certificates of deposit, or stocks) is also an
important component of pre- and post-retirement income. Nonetheless, Meltzer focuses solely on earnings.
The paper offers no compelling rationale for this modification, even though one of its central features is the
representative consumer’s ability to reallocate income over time. In the context of this model, the case for only
considering earnings is very difficult to make. Especially for the elderly, focusing on earnings rather than income has
a major impact on the value of ϕ0. As households age both income and earnings fall, but earnings fall much more than
income. Fig. 1, which draws on the 2003 Consumer Expenditure Survey, shows that earnings equal 77% of income for
households with a respondent between 55 and 64. But, for households with a respondent between 65 and 74, earnings
represent only 35% of income, and this falls to 10% for households with a respondent over 74.
In addition, the average propensity to consume among the elderly is close to unity, averaging 1.03. Because incomes
tend to be lower in retirement, these average propensities to consume give rise to average per capita annual dissaving
of only $481 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2005). This equals 2.7% of Meltzer’s earnings-based estimate. This pattern
of very small levels of saving or dissaving has been found by Nieswiadomy and Rubin (1995) using the 1972–1973
and 1986–1987 Consumer Expenditure Surveys.
In short, savings by the elderly are approximately zero. Even if one accepted the Meltzer model, ignoring ϕ0 in
empirical work should have little or no effect on cost effectiveness ratios for the elderly and should modestly bias up
the cost effectiveness ratios for everyone else.
A closer look at the theoretical underpinnings of Meltzer’s model is now in order. It should be clear that Meltzer’s
budget constraint, which is 0 =
∑
Tδ
tSt(Mt)(yt − ct − pmt), drives his results. In particular, it is the weighting of annual
budgets by St(Mt) that generates ϕ0.
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Fig. 1. Per capita incomes, earnings, and expenditure.
There are two ways of modeling budget constraints for uncertain lifetimes in the literature. These approaches, which
I call the Annuity and Conditional models, have differing implications, yet I am aware of no rigorous comparison of
them.
Meltzer’s budget constraint is an example of an Annuity model. Other authors, including Blomqvist (2002) and
Barro and Friedman (1977), have also used Annuity models. In rationalizing this approach, Meltzer and Blomqvist
explicitly make an analogy with a life annuity. The analogy cannot be exact, however, as death does not cancel all cash
flows. Taxes still have to be paid, the house still exists, the car payment remains due, mutual fund dividends still accrue,
and so forth. Thus, the first criticism of an Annuity approach is that it does not accurately describe the consumer’s
financial circumstances. A related criticism is that the Annuity approach understates the consumer’s resources. What
constrains spending on consumption goods and medical care in period t is yt, not St(Mt)yt. A consumer with $100,000
to spend in the next period and a probability of survival of 90% is not limited to spending $90,000. Although yt can
be a lottery, it needs to be a lottery that is well defined if the consumer lives, and this is not true for Annuity budget
constraints.
In writing down the budget constraint that will hold if the consumer survives, Garber and Phelps use a Conditional
budget constraint. Representative examples include Johansson (2001), Caballero (1991) and Abel (1986). In addition
to correctly characterizing the resources available to consumers, Conditional budget constraints lack some of the
problematic features of Annuity budget constraints.
A simple two-period model helps make this clear. We seek to maximize U(c0, H(M0)) + S1(M1)U(c1, H(M1)). (Note
that H(M0), H(M1), and S1(M1) were defined in Section 2). As in Barro and Friedman (1977), U(·) is time invariant,
income is the same in both periods, ∂U/∂ct > 0, ∂2U/∂ct∂ct < 0, and there is no interest or discounting.) To set up a
Conditional model, let y − c0 − s − pm0 = 0 be the constraint in year 0 and y − c1 + s − pm1 = 0 be the constraint in year
1. The opportunity to save or borrow in period 0 ensures the equality of the marginal utility of income. Substituting
these constraints into the objective function yields
U(y − s − pm0, H(M0)) + S1(M1)U(y + s − pm1, H(M1)). (15)
First, note that is that this is a well-formed objective function for expected utility maximization. This is not a trivial
point. Accepting an Annuity approach, as Meltzer and Blomqvist (2002) recommend, means rejecting the Condi-
tional approach, and the basis for doing so needs to be clear. In particular, there is no reason why y could not be
an annuity payment. Recognizing that social security and many other pensions are structured like annuities does not
mean that one must reject a Conditional budget constraint. Second, the implications of this model are straightfor-
ward. Solving for *m0 implies that *γ0 = p/*Δ0. Solving for *s gives ∂U/∂c0 = S1(M1)∂U/∂c1, which implies that
consumption plans will depend on the probability of survival. As we will see, an Annuity model makes a very
different and very counter-intuitive prediction about consumption patterns. Finally, the results are identical if the prob-
lem is set up by substitution or using a Lagrangian. Again, this is not trivial, as it will not be true for the Annuity
approach.
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Setting up an Annuity model is more complex, as S1(M1)(y − c1 + s − pm1) = 0 is the constraint in year 1. Because
expected utility is defined with respect to c1, not S1(M1)c1, substitution is not straightforward. (This is also an
example of the earlier point that Annuity budget constraints do not describe the budget set accurately.) However,
assuming that S1(M1) = 0, the year 1 constraint implies that y − c1 + s − pm1 = 0, so one can replicate (15). Manip-
ulating the constraint like this leads to the same results as the Conditional budget constraint: *γ0 = p/*Δ0 and
∂U/∂c0 = S1(M1)∂U/∂c1. However, setting this up as a Lagrangian gives different results: *γ0 = (p − ϕ0)/*Δ0 and
∂U/∂c0 = ∂U/∂c1. In addition to generating Meltzer’s result, using a Lagrangian to analyze an Annuity model implies
that consumers will choose consumption without regard for survival probabilities, which seems quite counter-intuitive.
It implies that a patient with Stage 3 ovarian cancer (who has a 75% chance of being alive next year) would not be
interested in shifting consumption from next year to this year (perhaps by taking that once-in-a-lifetime trip to the
Orient).
Thus, this section has shown that the Meltzer effect is unlikely to have any meaningful empirical impact. It has also
argued that the budget constraint that generates ϕ0 is problematic. At a minimum, the case for including the Meltzer
effect in cost effectiveness ratios has not been made.
5. Related costs
Weinstein and Manning (1997) note that Meltzer and Garber–Phelps do not explicitly analyze how to deal with
related costs. A reader might conjecture that Section 4, in suggesting that ϕ0 need not be considered, also implies that
related costs should not be considered. A counterexample demonstrates that this conjecture is false. I focus on a case
suggested by Garber and Phelps in which mt is conditionally dependent on m0, because this produces the simplest
counterexample.
Conditional dependence means that ∂mt/∂m0 = 0, given the baseline probability of survival and income in period t.
This includes cases with multi-period treatment protocols, so choosing an initial intervention determines subsequent
medical spending plans. It also includes some of the more ambiguous cases that Weinstein and Manning (1997) raise.











































































(yt − ct − pmt) = 0. (17)
∑
T
δtSt(M)(yt − ct − pmt) = 0. (18)
Eq. (19) rearranges and simplifies these results. It shows clearly that related costs should be treated quite differently
from unrelated costs. Related costs are represented by the term p
∑
sδ
tSt∂mt/∂m0. Although they should be discounted
for elapsed time, the probability of survival, and the degree of relatedness, related future costs should enter cost
effectiveness calculations:












Ht/∂mt)(∂mt/∂m0) + Ut(∂St/∂m0) + Ut(∂St/∂mt)(∂mt/∂m0)], and ϕ0 =
∑
Tδ
t((∂St/∂m0)(yt − ct − pmt) + (∂St/∂mt)(∂mt/
∂m0)(yt − ct − pmt)) = 0.
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A very similar result emerges for the Garber–Phelps model of Section 2. It differs in that ϕ0 is explicitly equal to
zero and in that the absence of capital markets means that the decision maker may not be able to allocate consumption
optimally across periods:






Here ζt represents βtSt(Mt)(∂Ut/∂yt)/(∂U0/∂y0). Both models imply that the present value of related costs should be
taken into account.
6. Extension to an expected health maximization model
Some analysts base cost effectiveness analysis on a health maximization model, in which quality adjusted life years
are defined solely in terms of health status. This section shows that the results for the Garber–Phelps model apply to
health maximization models as well (Williams, 1997). In such models unrelated future costs should be excluded and
related future costs should be included.
In expected health maximization models a decision maker with a fixed budget seeks to maximize expected health
status or some health indicator rather than utility. Denote this indicator by Ht(Mt, Xt), with Mt = m0, m1, . . ., mt and
Xt = x0, x1, . . ., xt representing consumption to date of two medical products.
Focusing on Ht(Mt, Xt) has two effects: non-medical consumption is no longer an argument and the Ht(Mt, Xt)
need not correspond to a utility function. The objective function is now
∑
T
βtSt(Mt, Xt)Ht(Mt, Xt), with survival
probabilities again serving as weights. The health decision maker budget spends a fixed budget, Bt, entirely on
medical products. So Bt = pmt + qxt, using
∑
T
βtSt(Mt, Xt)Ht(Mt, Xt) +
∑
T
κt(Bt − pmt − qxt). Assuming that the






























− κ0q = 0. (22)
Bt − pmt − qxt = 0. (23)






































This tells us that the health decision maker should be consistent and should ignore ϕ0. Although the definition of
a quality adjusted life year has changed, the results for the Garber–Phelps model apply. Related costs again appear in


















St(Mt, Xt)(∂Ht/∂ms + (∂Ht/∂mt)∂mt/∂ms) + Ht(Mt, Xt)(∂St/∂ms + (∂St/∂mt)
∂mt/∂ms)
]
. (The apparent change in ∗Δ-
s has no empirical consequences. This represents just an elaboration of why
future health status changes.)
In short, expected health maximization models should treat future costs in the same fashion as expected utility
models. The reader can use the logic of Section 5 to quickly show that including the present value of unrelated
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future costs or excluding the present value of related future costs will distort opportunity costs (hence cost effec-
tiveness ratios). Under quite general conditions this will distort decision making and fail to maximize expected
health.
7. Conclusions
Using cost effectiveness analysis to support health- or utility-maximizing decisions demands getting opportunity
costs right. Consistency is not enough. This paper has shown that how one treats future costs matters.
At issue is whether unrelated future costs need to be considered in calculating cost effectiveness ratios. This paper
has shown that the controversy in the literature is due to differences in modeling budget constraints. Analyzes that use
a Conditional budget constraint, as Garber and Phelps do, imply that unrelated future costs need not be considered.
Analyzes that use an Annuity budget constraint, as Meltzer does, imply that future savings (which are affected by a
wide range of unrelated future costs) need to be considered. Having identified the source of the dispute, the paper goes
on to argue that Conditional budget constraints are preferable. Conditional budget constraints accurately describe the
budget set, are robust to differences in how the analysis is set up, have plausible predictions in other domains, and
would apply even if all income took the form of a life annuity.
Even if one were to rely on an Annuity model, this paper has demonstrated that the consequences are likely to be
minimal. The present value of future saving (weighted by the change in survival probabilities that a therapy induces)
will much smaller than Meltzer’s earnings-based estimates suggest. Furthermore, Annuity models, like Conditional
models, imply that the present value of related future costs should be accounted for.
This paper has also demonstrated that the same rules apply to health maximization and utility maximization. Both
require accounting for the present value related future costs and ignoring unrelated future costs. Failure to do so will
bias cost effectiveness calculations.
Although they clarify the task of the cost effectiveness analyst, these results do not simplify it. As Weinstein and
Manning (1997), 126, note, it is difficult to disentangle “related” costs from “unrelated” costs. In such cases it is
perfectly appropriate to include costs that are related in a colloquial sense to calculate an upper bound on the cost per
quality adjusted life year.
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